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Abstract 
This paper provides a series of work on risk management models to identify the assets 
and risks. The goal of modeling them is to analyze and calculate meaning of the level of 
security in the cyber world. Analyzing and calculating was done by the quantitative method, 
so that the investment decision in security tools were expected to be objective, which were 
based on performance and situational experiences in an organization. Risk management 
was then associated with the calculation of costs that may occur with the point of view of the 
financial aspects of ROI/CBA, such as NPV, IRR, and ROI, so it can be measured in the 
level of security of the organization and can be maintained within a certain period. Our 
model consisted sixteen formulas that can show the increasing level of security based on the 
cost. 
 
Keywords: Risk Management, Network Security, Security Level, Risk Assessment, Asset 
Identification, and CIA 
 
1. Introduction 
The use of digital technology and the Internet in the business world was an effort so that 
the business could run more effective and efficient. An improvement in customer service 
was expected, while the cost of the business becoming more efficient. However, the 
development of business applications in the Internet were also accompanied by an increase 
of cyber crime that could disrupt business processes to the detriment of the company 
(Viduto et al., 2012; Bojanc et al., 2012). Becoming more obvious that Internet security was 
very important. However, the cost of security for this issue was very high, while on the 
other side network security level was difficult to measure when compared to the cost 
incurred. Because of that, great number companies were reluctant to spend money to 
improve the security of these networks (Harland et al., 2002; Hare and Goldstein, 2010). It 
was a question in business about how the cost of dollars relates to how much security level 
will be achieved. 
This paper discussed the correlation between the cost incurred and the extent of security 
that could be achieved. Clarity in security level, when network security was characterized 
by an increase in the safe and convenience service for customer, compared to the cost 
incurred could convince company to incur in securing its networks. This is consistent with 
the concept of security, the CIA (confidentiality, integrity, availability) (Whitman and 
Mattord, 2010; Rahimi and Zagham, 2012; Ioannidis et al., 2012; Viduto et al., 2012). 
Management of the company has always considered the risk of financial and business 
aspects of such issue and it becomes a mindset for decision making in corporate 
management. Studies have produced a modeling standard to relate cost value and the level 
of security so that the decision making could be performed in a more objective, measurable, 
effective and efficient way when determining the level of security of the company (Bojanc 
et al., 2012). (Harland et al., 2002). 
This research that was conducted to standardize model was preceded through intense 
discussions with professionals in network security field, which was able to gather 
information to build a refinement model, read publications associated with this problem and 
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perform simulations as well. Models which currently exist only discussed the technical 
aspects of identification only, and not discussed thoroughly until the financial calculations 
and business processes that complicate the analysis, calculation, and implementation. On 
this research, a model was made with the consummation of the more easily understood and 
international standardization refers to the National Institute of Standards and Technology 
Special Publish 800 Series (NIST-SP800) on guidelines for conducting risk assessments and 
the International Organization for Standardization ISO 27001/27002: 2005 regarding 
information security systems and evaluation models management for financial calculations 
(Bojanc et al., 2012; Viduto et al., 2012). 
In the process of applying this research in modeling, someone who was able to identify, 
classify, and control the risks from various sources asset is needed (Lo and Chen, 2012). In 
addition, to get the maximum results in the application of the proposed model requires 
common understanding in terms of network security as one of the assumptions of the model 
is made all the stakeholders that have a high understanding of network security. It is implied 
as one of the assumptions of the model is made all the stakeholders that have a high 
understanding of network security. Therefore, to equate understanding of this network 
security, training program is conducted for all stakeholders to raise awareness and as well to 
plant good knowledge and high vigilance against threats and vulnerabilities of a system 
(Luminita and Magdalena, 2012; Pander, 2001). 
 
2. Methodology 
The approach to identify risk factor followed reference from ISO Standard/ IEC 
27001/27002 and NISP SP800 (Viduto et al., 2012; Bojanc et al., 2012; Lo and Chen 2012) 
which was then mapped to the form of variables that were considered vulnerable and threat 
potential. Discussion in the modeling of risk factors was intended to protect CIA in the 
business process. 
Organizational investment companies issue policies to improve information security 
covering processes, and technology, which was developed in the form of system variables 
including system information software and hardware that use, store, and transmit that 
information. Through the implementation of these policies, training and awareness 
programs on network and information security are done in order to obtain a more effective 
investment decisions and efficient (Ioannidis et al., 2011; Yue et al., 2006; Harland et al., 
2002; Hare and Goldstein 2010; Bojanc et al., 2012). 
Several approaches and methodology used to perform risk assessment among others were 
RAOM (Risk Assessment and Optimization Model) (Viduto et al., 2012; Yue et al., 2006) 
and Robust Technology (Titarenko, 1997). Yet risk assessment and decision making of 
investment were made through ROI/CBA approach, that was objectively assessing losses to 
get the calculation of NPV, IRR, and ROI with certain assumptions (Hare and Goldstein, 
2010; Viduto et al., 2012; Bojanc et al., 2012). 
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Figure 1. Frame Risk Activity Model 
The discussion of network security on the technical and nontechnical aspect were 
overlooked through six terms of approach, namely 1) Financial loss (budget and policy), 2) 
Performance losses (operating losses), 3) Physical losses (technical), 4) Psychological harm, 
5) Social disadvantage, 6) Loss time (time management) (Harland et al., 2002; Reggiani 
2012). 
 
3. Modeling 
To complete the planning process modeling, it was conducted conceptual framework and 
methodology development while collecting some data information. Figure 1 illustrated the 
model of the framework. 
Conducting assessment on the security level overview early could be seen as a mean of 
controlling business risk as a representation of risk management activity. Through 
quantitative mathematical modeling approach, more objective assessment was thus 
expected. Using the model describing those recommendations, the management could 
provide all the decision in managing the existing system during certain period, either to 
maintain or to increase the previous security level through preventive, corrective or 
detective action. 
The more the evaluation of these models according to the recommendations was 
conducted, the quicker new issue was identified conforming immediate risk aversion. Thus 
the network security level could continue to scale to a certain value. 
 
4. Formulation 
Assessment of risk reduction objective would be obtained by referring to NIST-SP800, 
ISO/IEC 17799, and ISO 27001/27002 as the standard of network security. It was then 
linked to several quantitative methods such as RAOM which was combined with weighted 
assessment of Gordon & Loeb and Robust Technology, and the evaluation model as the 
basis of business management control and financial aspects as well. 
After doing research from several sources and some improvements, it was revisited and 
reviewed, in a more compact preposition, the risks that must be accepted and pursued it by a 
number of considerations and specific controls mitigating the worst risk with the following 
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basic formula. 
 
        (events) x (probability) x (consenquenses) 
 
with: 
Events: all production activities within organization (usually event services) collected 
through monitoring its success or failure 
Probability: Likelihood assumption of all production activity predicted to cause loss or 
error which determined through objective evaluation using weighing score. 
Consequences: controlling and considering the worst possible loss as a minimum 
consequence that must be accepted. 
Before doing the modeling, variables should be prepared and collected first to facilitate 
the process of building model and formula which were going to become the result of this 
research. Table 4.1 enlisted those variables and its description. 
Table 1. Definition Variable 
Var Description
Total expectation lose
N Attach Incident (Event)
Probability
V Vulnerability
T Threat
W Weigthed
z Weigthed for Costing
TWR Total Weighted Risk
Likehood
S(a) Ekpektasi dari value suatu aset
S(P) Security Requirement
C Cost 
TC Total Cost
R Risik
L(t) Lose
Expectation Solution
B Benefit
ROI Return on Investment
NPV Net Present Value
IRR Internal rate of return
r
Si
Lij
Sl
 
 
The material from NIST-SP800, ISO/IEC 17799, and ISO 27001/27002 were adapted 
and formed into risk framework planning in which quantitative and probabilistic methods 
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explained previously were added. Specifically, the concept of risk that was a sum of 
multiplication of events, probability and consequences was added as well. Preceded by that 
basic formula, through further consideration and analysis, above explained concept was 
derived into concise formula and model so that it became easier to be carried and 
understood. 
Table 1 enlisted the symbol and description of variables in the formula used to perform 
quantitative calculation, modeling and derivative formulas. Hence the process of 
considering the risk could be measured mathematically in order to achieve more objective 
consideration.  
Figure 2 discussed steps to be taken in modeling by considering risk factor to determine 
the network security level and finalized with the financial evaluation which was able to be 
mapped and extracted as derivative formula for certain variable and quantitative formula on 
each step. There were seven sub steps on each step resulting in brief explanation for both 
formula and its derivatives resulting as many as 16 formulas (Viduto et al., 2012; Bojanc et 
al., 2012).  
The first step was to identify the system for appraising some assets as a means of 
production by examining risks that might arise in the future. Things that should be taken 
into account as inputs were: 
1. Determine the system or asset within a business organization such as hardware, 
software, and system interfaces. 
2. Workers or employee or user or staff. 
3. Mission or purpose of the built system/developed system. 
4. It was composed into system parameter for supporting business needs or requirement on 
the organization. 
Assessment of the organization’s assets in companies was performed using the following 
formula: 
asset Value
1


m
i
iii
SN V     (1)  
Refer to Table 1 for description of variables 
iii
SN V ,,, 
..
 
The second step was to identify the vulnerability risk and threat. Vulnerability was every 
possible risk appearing in the future which stands as an input when analyzing existing 
system susceptibility which in itself was a possible threat for organization in the later days. 
The basic input could come from historical analysis data of attack, intelligence data, mass 
media, report of risk event, audit report, and also demand and security expectation from the 
company itself, including the result of safety tests conducted. 
During the vulnerability assessment, identification was necessarily defined according to 
the existence of vulnerability. Value 1 means it had vulnerability and conversely value 0 
means it did not have any vulnerability. Further identification of the risk was represented by 
the threat (Threat = T) which was likely to occur, through the same identifying manner, 
which value 1 was given for having a threat, and zero value for the absence of threat. 
Described in the following formula (2), (3) for a total expectation of vulnerability and threat, 
and for the number of events was the possibility of the value of V and T as in formula (4). 
    .,...,2,1,0,1 niiiVV    (2) 
    .,...,2,1,0,1 mjjjTT    (3) 
vTvT .),(      (4) 
 
With probability threat and vulnerability: 
T: v = 1:1, means that one threat occurrence was caused by one vulnerability. 
T: v = 1: ~, means one threat occurrence caused by several vulnerabilities. 
T: v = ~:1, means that some threat occurrences were caused by single vulnerability. 
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Risk could be assessed more objectively by the means of quantitative evaluation using 
weighing approach. It was determined and considered by experience basis, which the 
estimation of this assessment was usually based on certain management policy of 
organization. The following formula (5) was the amount of risk could be calculated 
objectively with specific values: 
 
iw
Low 0.1( )
Medium 0.5( )
High 1( )
ì
í
ï
î
ï
 
TWR = Lij iW iV
i=i
n
å
j=1
m
å    (5) 
The third step was risk assessment, which analyzed the existing assets, and to plan an 
assessment to the identified assets. Then it was associated with the possibility of incidents, 
threats, vulnerabilities nature, and limitation of the needs and capabilities of the 
organization. Afterwards, the result which reflects the quantitative value was used as a 
means of consideration whether to accept or manage the risk. In other words, comparison 
could be conducted by comparing the loss of assets S (a) and the value of the security 
requirements that could be overcome )( S , which at most had the same maximum values. 
Through the similar identification method in the 2nd step, whether the solution addresses 
business issue could be measured, which the value of 1 indicated that the right solution was 
implemented, value of 0 indicated the contrary, and value of -1 indicated that the solution 
even created another new issue. Done preparing set of items through formula (6), score 
weighing was performed to find the precision of solution to the threat emerged. Formula (7) 
was a process to fulfill CIA requirements in the system network security. 
S = Sl{ } = 1,0{ }"l, l =1,2,...,k.   (6) 
 = S(a) )( S     (7) 
The fourth step was business impact analysis which analyzed from business continuity 
perspective of an organization. Consideration performed on this step was done by 
conforming itself to the organization capabilities in term of financial, time, psychology, etc. 
When looking company business, total financial loss should be calculated through analysis 
of sensitivity and critical asset level. In order to measure such thing, assumption regarding 
possible value should be made in regards to asset value, expected security level, and 
whether the new asset requirement could overcome business issue from the risk aspect. This 
was a precise question leading to disharmony and subjectivity in risk. This topic was stated 
in the formula (8), with assumption of having 4 costs variables and it was then summed to 
cost of right solution resulted from formula (9). 
 












il
il
il
il
il
li
vcreatesdireclySif
vcreatesindireclySif
matchtdonvandSif
vaddressesindirectlySif
vaddressesSif
Z
1
5,0
'0
5,0
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Ci = Cn
n=1
4
å    (8) 
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TC = Cl Sl :Cl>0,"l Cl( )
l=1
k
å
ì
í
ï
îï
ü
ý
ï
þï
   (9) 
 
Figure 2. Risk Activity Model 
Forth, risk management activity saw the benefit of this consideration by evaluating if the 
means was able to reduce financial loss or on the contrary it still needed to continue the 
identification and performed ongoing change by making revisions. Referring to matrix table 
created, a risk formula derived from all preceding formula aboves(1-9) could be formed in 
to risk form (R) like formula (10). Problems found should be identified from vulnerability, 
threat, and best minimal possible solution, which correlated to cost and risk in formula (11). 
This issue was bounded by other risk parameters. 
R = TWR- Lji
i=1
n
å
j-1
m
å
l=1
k
å li zliSl
ì
í
ï
îï
ü
ý
ï
þï
   (10) 
R = r.L =T.v. L[ ]     (11) 
min
S
l
TC,R[ ]      (12) 
Where strategy expectation design parameter risk: 
 Rmax  The maximum acceptable value of risk to the organization. 
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 Lmax  The maximum time of incident causing loss was still acceptable to the 
organization 
 Rmin  The minimum reasonable risk value to organization 
The fifth step was risk determination, which analyzed the total loss aroused, controlled in 
many ways to reduce the occurrence of losses that was sorted by priority to avoid the worst 
possible loss. This can be achieved after enduring some considerations on the 4 previous 
steps. Finally, risk assessment result (R) that may appear with total loss (L) that may occur 
can be acquired. 
Looking at the exposure of 5 steps above, certain level of risk within an organization 
could be perceived. This result could serve as a consideration factor on the next step to 
protect organization from the possible worst risk. Afterwards, activity controlling and 
evaluating current asset used to run business was done continously and unceasedly by 
utilizing the most effective and efficient solution using below financial formula: 
c
RRB 
0
     (13) 
ROI =
B-C
C
     (14) 
NPV =
Bt -Ct
1+ i( )
t
t -0
n
å     (15) 
Bt - tC
1+ IRR( )
t
t=0
n
å = 0     (16) 
The sixth step discussed the control recommendations, which oversaw the benefit gained 
compared to the cost incurred. It was followed by evaluation to find whether what was done 
was able to give benefit and contribution when the risk occurs, or adding new problem 
instead. 
Table 2. Risk Assessment 
Measure Risk Lose Cost Implement Note
Reduction - - C<Budgeting Yes/No
1. Lose is not significan
2. Cost reduction
Transfer - L>Lmax C<Budgeting Yes/No
1. Lose high
2. Should be Implemented
    mitigate risk
Avoidence R>Rmax - C<Budgeting No
1. Risk maximal.
2. Cost high, that is not
    balance to mitigate risk
Acceptance R<Rmin - C<Budgeting No
1. Risk Minimal, Free Cost
2. Risk acceptance
 
 
Table 2 showed qualitative logic in order to understand about the expectation of company 
regarding R (risk), L (lose) and C (cost). As shown in Table 2, the next step could be 
prepared when doing implementation. Because of the cost that will incur, which would be 
discussed thoroughly later on, quantitative calculation could be done in advance by 
evaluating model to cost (c) and benefit (B). In other words, it was comparing benefit 
gained and cost incurring. 
The seventh step discussed implementation and continuous improvement to control each 
approved policy in organization to gain better benefit measured by financial aspect. At this 
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step an organization protected itself from potential attack by providing security anticipation 
that could be classified into 3 categories impacting the risk(R), probability, and loss (L) 
variables. 
The steps above recommended early check to identify risks that might occur in the future 
day during certain period as soon as possible. The quicker risk identification was performed, 
the quicker possibility of loss or damage which sometimes leads to worsen situation or 
financial loss would be recognized. 
 
5. Result 
To easily understand the use of created model, here, a simple scenario sample was given 
so that directions might be obtained when developing quantitative calculation to reduce the 
risk in the network related to business and financial of the company. 
Initially, the implementation process of that scenario was mapped to the model created. 
On the telecommunication network, specifically internet service, the key was to keep the 
service up and running. It was sought by keeping the CIA in maximum possible way for the 
network built of software and hardware. In Table 3, the use of formula (1), (2), and (3) to 
determine vulnerability related to threat could be observed. 
Table 3. Vulnerability Assessment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4. Mapping of Vulnerability and Threat 
Threat Action of Threat
Number 
Threat (T)
Relation 
T and V
Incompetent 
User
Easy to get Access 1 1,3,4,5,9,10
Physical attach 2 1, 2, 3, 4,9
Hacker Social engineering 3 2,9, 10
Protection relevant 
Mechanisms
4 5, 8, 9
Trick attack Adminitrator loss control 5 2,3,5,7,9, 10
Management weaknesses 6 8,9,10
Virus, Trojan, Worms 7 5, 6, 8
Service 
admin
Password compromise 8 1,2,7,8
Force attack 9 1,2,6,9
Arbitrary to access 10 1,2,4,7,10
Industri DoS attack 11 5,6,8
No Audit 12 1,5,6,10  
Number 
(V)
Vulnerability (V)
Impact to 
(CIA)
1 User password blank C
2 Administrator Password diclosure I
3 Open Port Terminal (SSH) weaknesses C
4 Malformed UDP packet vulnerability C
5 Virus not upgrade I
6 Vulnerability Devices A
7 Database using root privileges A
8 Limited network application I
9 Access control weak, allow local access C
10 Control management weak I
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Forth, associated with possible threat as shown in Table 4 (Mapping of Vulnerability and 
Threat) and formula (4), vulnerability matrix was developed by mapping based on Table 3 
and Table 4 so that weighing score, minimum(0.1), medium(0,5), maximum (1), could be 
assigned. 
Here, in Table 5, was the result of mapping in the assessment weighing. 
Table 5. Matrix Vulnerability and Threat 
T * V 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 0.5 0 0.1 0.1 0.5 0 0 0 0.5 0.1
2 1 0.5 0.1 0.1 0 0 0 0 0.1 0
3 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.5 0.1
4 0 0 0 0 0.1 0 0 0.5 0.5 0
5 0 0.5 0.1 0 0.5 0 0.1 0 0.1 0.5
6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.5 0.1 1
7 0 0 0 0 1 0.1 0 0.1 0 0
8 1 0.5 0 0 0 0 0.1 0.1 0 0
9 0.5 0.1 0 0 0 0.1 0 0 1 0
10 0.1 0.5 0 0.5 0 0 0.1 0 0 1
11 0 0 0 0 0.5 0.5 0 0.5 0 0
12 0.1 0 0 0 0.5 0.5 0 0 0 1  
 
In determining the level of security, step to be taken was to analyze the precision of 
solution which could be distinguished into 3 categories, described in NIST-SP800, ISO 
1799, and ISO 27001/27001, which were operation, management and technical. Table 6 
showed information regarding this. 
Table 6. Mapping Solution  
Number 
Solution (S)
Categories Activity to Solution Solution of Measure
1 Technical Identification Management Maintenance system user
2 Technical Cryptographic key management Key Lifecycle Manager
3 Technical System protection System Protection OS
4 Technical Authentication LDAP
5 Technical access control enforcement Setting MAC and DAC
6 Technical Transaction Privacy Digital Certificates
7 Technical Audit Audit License
8 Technical Detection system Create Firewall
9 Technical Virus detection Antivirus Sistem
10 Management Security responsible Security Responsibilities System
11 Management Privilage Management Control management system
12 Management Security Awareness & Technical Trainning Trainning
13 Management Periodic system audit Penetration testing
14 Management Test and maintenance it Periodict audit report
15 Operational Biometri access control Develop Policy
16 Operational Control software virus Patching
17 Operational Control terminal (PC) Secure Lock
18 Operational Provide physical security (detektor) CCTV  
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Before moving to the next step, score weighing should be done first to assess the 
accuracy of solution to the existing vulnerabilities, as mapped in Table 7. The next step 
would make assumption about cost spending for overcoming the vulnerability and threat 
which were associated according to the step taken in fourth model, specifically formula (9) 
and (10). Hence the total cost could be calculated as shown in Table 7. 
Table 7. Mapping Solution Matrix 
S * V 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Medium
1 1 -0.5 0.5 0 0.5 0 -0.5 0 -0.5 -0.5 0.25
2 0 -0.5 0.5 -0.5 0 0 0 0.5 0.5 -0.5 0.15
3 -0.5 -1 1 1 0 0 1 0.5 0.5 1 0.58
4 1 0 0.5 0 0.5 0 0.5 -0.5 -0.5 0.5 0.25
5 0 -0.5 0.5 0 0.5 0 1 1 0 0 0.28
6 0.5 -0.5 0.5 0 0.5 -0.5 0 0 -0.5 -0.5 0.18
7 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 1 0.5 0.5 0.5 1 0.5 0.40
8 0.5 -0.5 0 0 0.5 0 0.5 1 0.5 0.5 0.25
9 0 0 0 0.5 1 0.5 0.5 0 0 0 0.18
10 0 0.5 0 0 0 0 0.5 0 0 1 0.15
11 0 0.5 0.5 0 0 0 0 0 0.5 0 0.08
12 1 1 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 1 1 1 1 0.70
13 0.5 -0.5 1 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 1 1 0.5 0.48
14 1 1 0.5 0.5 1 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.48
15 -0.5 -0.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.05
16 0 0 0 0 1 0.5 0 0 0.5 0 0.15
17 0 0 0.5 0 -0.5 0 0 0 0 0.5 0.08
18 -0.5 -1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.5 0.5 0.18  
Table 8. Total Cost 
Number 
Solution (S)
Solution of Measure Operasional Man Power Budgeting Training
Total 
Cost ($)
1 Maintenance system user 2,500.00         25.00        
2 Key Lifecycle Manager 3,180.00        31.80        
3 System Protection OS 500.00       5.00          
4 LDAP 100.00        1,500.00    250.00           18.50        
5 Setting MAC and DAC 100.00        300.00       4.00          
6 Digital Certificates 400.00        1,000.00    500.00           19.00        
7 Audit License 100.00        155.00           300.00            5.55          
8 Create Firewall 1,000.00     2,500.00    1,100.00        46.00        
9 Antivirus Sistem 60.00          500.00       200.00           7.60          
10 Security Responsibilities System 2,500.00    25.00        
11 Control management system 1,000.00    10.00        
12 Trainning 300.00        2,000.00         23.00        
13 Penetration testing 1,000.00     5,000.00    60.00        
14 Periodict audit report 150.00        1,000.00    11.50        
15 Develop Policy 500.00        1,500.00    2,000.00         40.00        
16 Patching 500.00        200.00       7.00          
17 Secure Lock 500.00        1,000.00    500.00           20.00        
18 CCTV 1,000.00     300.00       3,000.00        43.00        
401.95  
 
It should be noted that to construct calculation of risk management exposed in previous 
tables, Table 3 through Table 7, required sufficient knowledge and experience so that the 
effort on risk reduction could be measured accurately and conform to organization 
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expectation. Subsequently, the decision making process, including policy development, was 
usually done through opinion survey spread to all stakeholders. This was to ensure that 
every decision made was accountable and consistent with the experience from every 
division which was operation, management and technical. At the end, decision could be 
made in more objective way as shown by the number in quantitative score. Hence, the 
weighing process was intended to convert the issue of experience from each division, which 
was a qualitative data, into quantitative component. 
After getting the total cost for risk anticipation or reduction, it was also necessary to 
consider the benefit through total asset value prediction to make it calculable in financial 
aspect. Considerations taken into account were NPV, IRR, and ROI. 
Usually, in order to predict the benefit gained, the maximum loss in one year was 
calculated along with how long it lasts (
max
L ). Additionally, financial risk that might occur 
if no action was given on the acknowledged risk should be taken into account as well with 
the certain discount rate according to company capability or equated to finance macro-
economics. 
Table 9. Total Cost and Risk Assessment 
Number 
Solution 
(S)
Solution of Measure
Total 
Cost ($)
Risk ($)
1 Maintenance system user 2,500     625       
2 Key Lifecycle Manager 3,180     477       
3 System Protection OS 500        288       
4 LDAP 1,850     463       
5 Setting MAC and DAC 400        110       
6 Digital Certificates 1,900     333       
7 Audit License 555        222       
8 Create Firewall 4,600     1,150    
9 Antivirus Sistem 760        133       
10 Security Responsibilities System 2,500     375       
11 Control management system 1,000     75         
12 Trainning 2,300     1,610    
13 Penetration testing 6,000     2,850    
14 Periodict audit report 1,150     546       
15 Develop Policy 4,000     200       
16 Patching 700        105       
17 Secure Lock 2,000     150       
18 CCTV 4,300     753       
40,195   10,463  
40,195   10,463   
 
The next step deal with the financial calculation process on the scenario by giving an 
assumption to cost incurred. If the cost was removed, there will be a loss or risk implication 
that was defined based on experience determined by management decision as shown in 
Table 9. Cost was considered as a price to be paid to acquire security through number of 
technical and non technical solution, while risk was a value assumed equal to losses value. 
Hereinafter, other assumptions, namely 15% discount, 30% of investment as operational 
cost, 3 years time period assuming 5 risks was recurred every year, were added. It used 3 
years assumption since the hardware life lasts for 3 years. Doing prevention would then 
acquire $51,723 benefit in 3 years from the investment assumption that was valued $40,195. 
Hence, NPV, IRR and ROI were calculated according to assumption and formula (11), (12), 
(13) as shown in Table 10. 
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Table 10 exposed the result of the calculation; NPV= $51,723, IRR=60%, ROI=76.37%; 
with the following assumptions: 
1. 15% discount corresponding to Bank standard on investment. 
2. Operating costs are generally 30% of the investment value. 
3. The length of implementation time which was 3 years assuming there were 5 
occurrences every year (15 occurrences in total). 
Above result spoke that $40,195 investment was more advantageous rather than accepting 
loss caused by each possible problem might be aroused in later days. The magnitude of 
these losses was proportional to value of NPV, IRR and ROI. 
The final step was to look at the changes that occur if the number of assumed event 
affecting NPV, IRR, and ROI was changed. Thus, it could be concluded that when the less 
event occurrence happens, the prediction made in the beginning was not right. The 
investment undergone losses since it was intended to prevent risk yet actually there was no 
vulnerability or threat as assumed previously. 
Table 10. Cost and Benefit Analysis 
Discount Rate 15%
Cost 0 1 2 3
40,195        12,059        12,059        12,059        76,371        
Discount rate 1 0.8696 0.7561 0.6575
PV 40,195        10,486        9,118          7,929          67,727        
Benefit 0 1 2 3
0 52,316        52,316        52,316        
Discount rate 1 0.8696 0.7561 0.6575
PV -             45,492        39,559        34,399        119,450      NPV Benefit
Discounted benefit-cost 40,195.00-   35,006.74   30,440.64   26,470.12   60% IRR
Cumulative benefit-cost 40,195.00-   5,188.26-     25,252.38   51,722.51   $51,722.51 NPV
NPV 51,723$      
ROI 76.37%
IRR 60%  
Contrarily, if all events assumed did occur, the greater the benefit was gained 
corresponding to the investment made for risk prevention. Table 11 showed the total event 
assumption which was 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 on each year so the comparison between NPV, IRR 
and ROI could be seen. 
Table 11. Financial Analysis 
Event NPV ROI IRR
2 19,947-      -29% -29%
3 3,943        5.82% 5.07%
4 27,833      41.10% 33.67%
5 51,723      76.37% 60.09%
6 75,612      111.64% 85.36%  
Table 12 expressed the simulation of changing benefit (B) affected by every assumed 
event change. The more predicted event occurs, the more is the benefit gained while it also 
showed a pertinence in doing threat and vulnerability analysis. This could be measured by 
the gain value generated from the calculation process. 
Detailed explanation could be seen on the Cartesian pictured on Figure 3 showing a 
combination of change pattern, cost, and benefit in accordance to formula (13), change in 
number of event associated to the mapping of  
max
R  and 
min
R as well as value 
in
L
m
and .
max
L  
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Hence, it was appeared that management' decision on investment could be analyzed through 
the drawing. 
Table 12. Event, Benefit, and Cost Simulation 
Payback
 Period
0 1 2 3
TC 40,195      50,681      59,799      67,727      
BENEFIT 2 -            18,197       34,020       47,780       
BENEFIT 3 -            27,295       51,031       71,670       
BENEFIT 4 -            36,394       68,041       95,560       
BENEFIT 5 -            45,492       85,051       119,450     
BENEFIT 6 -            54,591       102,061     143,340      
 
Figure 3 was then showing a simulation result explaining that every change in event 
occurrence affecting the benefit. It was even proven that the less assumed incident occurs, 
the less benefit was gained. This implied that the investment decision to reduce the risk was 
not appropriate. Otherwise, the more incident event occurs, the more is benefit gained which 
imply that the investment decision for risk reduction was more than appropriate. In 
conclusion the number of risk incident occurrence was equal to the benefit value of security 
implementation which was invested by certain cost. It was visible on the event's curve line 
that each event simulation was as a linear curve reducing risk. Moreover, it did significantly 
emerge on this simulation that reduction process changed 
max
R
min
R . In addition, a linear 
change on number of event didn’t mean a linear risk reduction ( 
max
R minR ). Yet, risk 
reduction was acquired in the form of Markowitz risk curve (not linear). 
 
 
Figure 3. Probability Event, Cost, and Benefit 
Figure 3 provided recommendation on organization to undertake: 
1. Reduction, as the risk 
max
R
min
R  was reduced, the company could continue to accept 
that risk upon implementing existing issue. In this way, benefit would be gained 
according the assumption and expectation stated previously. 
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2. Transfer, was performed when the accomplished time breaches the maximum threshold 
defined. On this simulation, it was expected that in maximum 3 years, risk reduction 
investment would return. 
3. Avoidance, was performed when the meeting point 
max
R and the value of the cost to do 
the anticipation of vulnerabilities and threats that had been assumed. 
If it couldn’t be attained, no investment should be made to anticipate the risk. 
On the next stage, it was important to do monitoring in regular basis so that risk 
management (preventive, corrective, detective action) could be done earlier. This was an 
implementation process and continuous improvement in organization which took finance 
and business continuity aspect into account. 
 
6. Conclusion 
Our model showed the association between risk assessment related to security level and 
investment cost. This model could be derived into 16 mathematic formulas. These sixteen 
formulas were grouped and attained based on 7 steps, namely 1) system identification, 2) 
threat and risk identification, 3) risk assessment, 4) business impact analysis, 5) risk 
determination, 6) control recommendations and 7) implementation and continuous 
improvement. It was believed this model in this research could be utilized by company 
management as a policy in decision making when considering an investment for network 
security, specifically when they shared the same judgment on financial and business aspects. 
The simulation carried was a verification process done by author to ensure the validity of 
this research. After series of test done through the simulation, it could be concluded that the 
change in number of event occurrence can affect the security valuation, the less security 
value gained. This showed inappropriate investment as an effort to reduce risk as investment 
cost should be lower. And conversely, the more event occurrence appears, the more security 
value obtained. Hence, the precision in predicting risk reduction over the investment cost 
was getting better. In other words, the number of risk occurrence equal to the security value. 
Thus the authors believed that the model could be utilized in other enterprise risk 
management case to measure the security level associated to financial and business aspects. 
 
7. Discussion 
This research had been done by making a model that could be used as a general reference 
for measuring network security level as an effort to reduce risk or financial loss in company. 
The research process had also been verified through simulation in mathematical quantitative 
derived to 16 formulas. Therefore, network security level could be measured from financial 
aspect in more objectives, effective and efficient manner. Methodology approach used on 
this study was RAOM (Risk Assessment and Optimization Model) Viduto et al., (2012) that 
is associated with the method of Gordon & Loeb by Yue et al., (2006) and Robust 
Technology by Titarenko (1997). 
The modeling had become a fully integrated model, initiated from information system 
identification process through quantitative approach NIST-SP800 and ISO 27001/27002 
discussing network security, continued by doing assessment using weighing score 
(Titarenko, 1997; Yue et al., 2006) and then linked to financial calculation using ROI/CBA 
method in the economic evaluation model, such as NPV, IRR and ROI (Hare and Goldstein, 
2010; Viduto et al., 2012; Bojanc et al., 2012). The simulation result was exposed on Figure 
3, in which it was capable to measure investment cost spent and security level attained. The 
result of this simulation could be developed into company decision management policy 
based on objective and measurable consideration. Hence, company risk management 
strategy in form of investment decision, which purpose was to secure the information 
system risk of threat and vulnerability in network, could be performed through the risk 
model created while also doing risk assessment periodically. 
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